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BOOK REVIEWS
By R. W. Baker. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons,
Ltd., 1950. Pp. xxi, 180.

THE HEARSAY RULE.

Professor Baker has expounded the existing English law governing
hearsay and has demonstrated how little the courts have done to make it
consistent or common sensible. He finds the English Evidence Act of 1938
entirely inadequate. He believes that the present approach to the exclusionary
rules should be reversed. Indeed, he agrees with the great Thayer that the
fundamental rule should be that all logically relevant evidence is admissible
and that exceptions to this rule should be made only for compelling reasons
of policy. This would require radical legislation for which the English bar
is not prepared. Professor Baker, therefore, contents himself with pointing
out inconsistencies and needless limitations in the currently accepted rules
and suggesting modifications which he believes might easily be made in the
near future.
After discussing the origin and theory of the hearsay rule, he examines
each of the recognized exceptions in detail and sets forth his deductions from
the judicial authorities, often indicating the views of leading commentators.
With the accuracy of his statements of the several rules I should not venture
to disagree. His book seems to me an invaluable guide to the practitioner in
the English courts as well as a stimulus to reform for the student of law. But
on much of his theory I do take issue.
Definitions.-Every author must be accorded the privilege of setting the
limits of the subject which he proposes to discuss, and it may be ungracious
to find fault with his definition. As Professor Baker remarks, any definition
of hearsay is open to criticism, and it is with some trepidation that he
submits this: "Hearsay consists of out-of-court assertions of persons who are
not called as witnesses offered as proof of the matters contained therein." 1
I suggest that in framing a comprehensive definition of hearsay one
should put as its basis the situation of a witness on the stand. The function of
the witness is to convey information to the trier of fact. In so doing he must
act under the sanction of an oath or its equivalent and be subject to crossexamination by the party against whom the information is offered. He may
use words, gestures or other conduct which will enable the trier to understand
1. P. 1.
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what he is trying to communicate. Whether conscious of the process or not,
the trier must answer each of the following questions: What is the content
of the information which the witness intends to convey? When that is
determined, does the witness believe it to be the truth? If so, does it correspond to what the witness at the time of the event or condition thought
he was perceiving, that is, is he remembering accurately or is his present
belief due in whole or in part to some other cause? To the extent to which
his memory is accurate, did what he thought he was perceiving correspond
to the actual event or condition? In short, if the trier is to find as a fact what
the witness intended to communicate, the trier must rely upon (1) the use
by the witness of the means of communication, usually his use of language,
(2) his sincerity, (3) his memory, and (4) his perception. In determining
the degree of reliance to be given to the testimony the trier has the advantage
of knowing that the witness is speaking under the truth-telling stimulus of
the oath and the expectation of being cross-examined; and, where an intelligent
cross-examination has occurred, the trier has been furnished information concerning each of the pertinent factors affecting the value of the testimony.
Now assume that the testimony of the witness describes the conduct of
another, call him A, and that the evidence of that conduct is offered for a
purpose which requires the trier to. treat A as if he were : witness; that is,
as if he were making assertions for the purpose of persuading the trier to
find the matter asserted. Obviously if A were present, he would not be
heard except under the conditions prescribed for a witness. To offer his
conduct as the equivalent of testimony is to offer evidence that has all the
defects of hearsay. This is too clear for argument where his conduct is an
express assertion, and it is no less true where the trier is to use the conduct
as if it were an assertion. Hearsay, then, should include evidence of any
conduct of a person not occurring at the trial which is offered for a purpose
that requires the trier to treat that person as if he were then and there
testifying. In some situations it will be clear that A, unlike the witness, did
not intend his conduct to operate as an assertion, but that the proponent
offers the evidence for a purpose which requires the trier to use A's conduct
as if A did so intend. This means that A is to be treated as if performing all
the functions of a witness. Consequently, the evidence should be classed as
hearsay.
With this conclusion Professor Baker seems to agree in his interpretation
of Wright v. Tatham.2 There on the issue of testator's testamentary capacity
letters written to him by several persons were offered in evidence; none of
them contained a statement of the belief of the writer as to the mental condi2. 7 A. & E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. 1837), aff'd, 5 CI. & F. 670, 7 Eng. Rep.
559 (H.L. 1838).
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tion of the testator. No letter was offered as tending to prove the truth of
any statement contained in it. There was nothing to indicate that the writer
had in mind any consideration of the testator's mental capacity. Each letter
was relevant only on the theory that its content was such as the writer would
have addressed to a person who was mentally normal. That is, the writer's
conduct was the basis of an inference to the writer's state of mind; namely,
his belief concerning the testator's sanity. But this belief, in and of itself,
was entirely immaterial and was relevant only as a basis for an inference
to the conduct of the testator as observed by the writer. The evidence was
offered as an assertion by the writer that the observed conduct was that of a
sane man. Professor Baker thinks that the judges correctly excluded the
letters as hearsay.
It is, therefore, somewhat puzzling to find him classifying as nonhearsay
evidence of the signature of an attesting witness offered as tending to prove
execution of the attested document by the purported maker. He accepts Baron
Parke's theory that the attester's signature shows only that he put his name
in the place and in the manner in which in the ordinary course of business
he would have done had he actually seen the document executed. "The proof
of attestation is not proof of a declaration but of a fact, the fact being
presumptive evidence of due execution, as otherwise the name would not
have been placed on the document. ' 3 Just what does this mean? When a
person is asked to sign as a witness to a signature, does he not understand
that he is asked to put his name down as evidence that the signature is
that of the purported maker? What else can he understand? And if he
puts his name down, is he not thereby intending to assert that the signature
is that of the purported maker? The evidence of his handwriting tends to
prove that he signed as a witness, and his signing as a witness is an assertion
that he did act as a witness. If the signature is preceded, as is often the case,
by the word "Witness" or "Attest," is there any escape from reading the
word and the signature as an assertion? And if such a word is lacking, isn't
the conduct in signing offered as an assertion? Is Baron Parke's pronouncement anything more than a declaration that a person will not put his name
down as a witness, that is, assert that he saw the execution, unless he did
see it? What did he mean by ordinary course of business? Certainly not
that the attester was in the business of witnessing documents, or that the
purported maker was in the business of executing documents; probably
he meant only the ordinary course of human conduct in the same circumstances. Isn't Baron Parke's explanation the same as that by which the court
in Doe v. Tatrford4 sought to make admissible entries in the regular course
3. P. 162.
4. 3 B. & Ad. 890, 110 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1832).
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of business? It states the theory upon which Greenleaf classified such entries
as res gestae, and upon which Professor Strahorn would make admissions
nonhearsay.5 Nothing is to be gained by calling the signature evidence-of a
fact rather than of a declaration. The signature is in effect an assertion, and
6
the evidence of it is offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
No doubt, as a matter of history the evidence was not recognized as
hearsay. But the same is true of extrajudicial admissions. Professor Baker
agrees that Greenleaf's view that an admission is a waiver of or substitute
for evidence cannot be supported, nor can Wigmore's original theory that
an admission could be used only to impeach the position of the admitter.
°He considers admissions out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth
of the matters asserted; evidence of them has always been received, and the
hearsay rule has never raised a barrier.
Professor Baker's treatment of res gestae is likewise subject to some
question. He contends that there is no exception in England for spontaneous
statements, and he gives good grounds for his conclusion. He insists also
that statements accompanying a relevant act, when admissible, are received
as original evidence and not as tending to prove the truth of the matters
stated. Where the statement, regardless of its truth, is itself legally operative,
this is beyond debate, as where words of sale, gift, loan, or bailment ac7
company the manual transfer of a chattel. But where, as in Bedingfield's case,
they merely "throw light" upon the act, they are offered for their truth. As I
understand the case, according to its exposition in the famous dispute between Cockburn and Pitt Taylor s the injured woman's statement "Oh,
Aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me," would have been admissible,
if the evidence had not shown that the defendant had ceased to pursue her.
If so, it would have been admissible evidence of the fact asserted; namely, that
it was Bedingfield who inflicted the injury. An explanation of this sort of
itself is of no substantive legal significance. Unless true, it has no relevance for
the proponent. It is an out-of-court assertion of a person not called as a
witness offered as proof of its truth and for nothing else. The same is true
of Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coomnbs, as Professor Baker interprets it,
for he assumes that the conduct of the customer was relevant and that the
5. Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Ride and .Admissions, 85 U. or. PA.
L. R v. 484, 491, 564 (1937).
6. Professor Baker has seen the manuscript of this review and has submitted some
comments. As to this paragraph, he says: ". . . bearing in mind that what we must look
at is what the courts are doing rather than what they say they are doing, I am prepared
to ... admit that you are right."
7. 14 Cox C.C. 341 (1879).
8. See Thayer, Bedingfield's Case, 14 Am. L. Rzv. 817 (1880) ; also in, THAYER,
(the woman's statement is quoted at page 218).

LEGAL EssAys 207-19 (1908)

9. 82 L.T. 347 (1901).
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offered evidence was a declaration of a customer "made when throwing
away a glass of beer." The opinion of Farwell, J. makes it clear that the
declaration must have been an assertion as to the taste or the poor quality of
the beer offered to prove the fact stated.' 0
By his definition Professor Baker excludes from hearsay former testimony. He treats the subject briefly under "Depositions." He states the
orthodox English view that the former testimony is admissible only where
the proponent of the former testimony and the opponent against whom it
is offered, or their respective predecessors in interest, were parties in the
former action. But he omitted to discuss why testimony upon the same
issue between other parties does not equally fall without his definition. It'
is certainly not "out-of-court assertions by persons not called as witnesses,"
and yet it is rejected as hearsay. Why isn't there complete satisfaction of the
requirement of his definition where the present opponent had full opportunity
to cross-examine the witness in the former trial, and how is the requirement
satisfied when the evidence is offered against a privy any more fully than
when it is offered against a stranger? On what theory can Morgan v.
Nicholl" rationally be harmonized with the orthodox English decisions?
The recent cases in America and Wigmore's discussion seem worth a word
as suggestions for a modification of the English rule.
Professor Baker does not examine prior contradictory statements of a
witness offered for their truth. They fall without his definition of hearsay, for
10. In speaking of the objection to the question "Have you received complaints
from customers?", he said that he thought the question had always been allowed, and
continued: "Counsel can certainly ask as to the facts.-Did the customer order beer?
Did he taste it? Did he finish it? What did he do with it? If the matter is left there
with the answer that he tasted it and left it or threw it away, the judge cannot avoid
an inference, and the cross-examining counsel is driven to ask for some explanation.
It is simpler, therefore, to allow the statement of the customer of the reason for his
conduct to be given in chief." 82 L.T. at 349. (The official report in [1901] 2 Ch. 608
does not include this discussion.)
The context makes it clear that Farwell, J., was treating this evidence as offered,
not on any question as to the extent of harm which may have resulted to defendant from
poor quality of the beer, but upon the issue whether the beer furnished defendant by
plaintiff was of poor quality. On this issue it is obvious that what any customer of
defendant did with the beer is entirely immaterial except as a basis of inference from
his conduct to his subjective condition, thence to the fact causing that condition; that is,
from the act of throwing it away, to his subjective perception that its taste was bad,
thence to the fact that its taste was bad and its quality unsatisfactory. On the issue
of quality his statement is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter
asserted and hearsay by Professor Baker's own definition. If the poor quality of the
beer had been otherwise shown, and if its effect upon customers was an issue, the
customer's reason would have been relevant and his assertion, while hearsay, would have
been admissible under Professor Baker's exception for a declaration of physical or
mental condition.
Professor Baker comments: "I feel that the Bedingfield Case proves nothing, nor
do I think that I endeavored to show that it proved anything. But I must admit that
the point you make with respect to Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coombs has a great
deal of force in it and would require careful reconsideration.
11. L.R. 2 C.P. 117 (1866).
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while they may be out-of-court assertions, they are by a person who is
called as a witness. The courts, in holding them hearsay; point out that the
statement when made was not made under the conditions required for testimony in court. The witness may now be under oath and subject to crossexamindtion but he was not so situated when he made the statement. Evidence
of prior consistent statements presents a similar problem, and a word by
Professor Baker concerning the treatment of this subject as compared with the
use of memoranda to refresh recollection would have been helpful.
Origin of the Hearsay Rule.-Professor Baker accepts the orthodox
notion that the rule is the product of the jury system.' 2 But he does not
make quite clear whether he means only that if the jury had continued to
exercise its original functions, the rule would never have developed. If so,
no one will disagree. But if he means that the rule owes its origin to the
notion that the jury could not be trusted to put a reasonable value upon
hearsay, I think he has made no case. It is true that the judges in the early
1800's gave this explanation, but they offered no data to support it, and
Professor Baker has supplied none. It is all very well to say that the jurors
were originally witnesses, but that is only a half-truth. They did perform
the function of the modern witness for they made known what they had
personally perceived, but they also gathered evidence from those whom they
deemed worthy and thus listened to and weighed the testimony of persons
not on oath and not subject to cross-examination; and there is nothing to
indicate that they had to get their information from percipient witnesses
alone. Furthermore, there can be little doubt that when testimony of witnesses was received during the 1400's, it was as a privilege granted the
parties to give additional information to the jurors; and the jurors were
until after the middle of the 1600's legally permitted to prefer what they
had learned by their own efforts to that which was presented to them in court.
The earliest case cited by Professor Baker'3 in which a distrust of
hearsay is mentioned points out that the jury gave it little weight. Gilbert
attributes its rejection principally to lack of oath, a reason which has no
peculiar application to jury trial. He says that the court must not rely on
the credulity of the witness; he says nothing about the credulity of the jurors,
and an early case emphasizes the lack of cross-examination, which is a
distinguishing characteristic of "the adversary system. Furthermore, as Professor Baker concedes, hearsay received without objection is usable for its
12. Professor Baker's comment: "I do not wish to join issue with you on the
question of the origin of the hearsay rule. There is doubtless much to be said for your
point of view. A much more detailed research than appears at present to be' available
is required before anything like positiveness can be expressed for either opinion."
13. Rolfe v. Hampden, 1 Dyer 53b, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B. 1541). The remark
of Newton, C.J., in Y.B. 20 Hen. VI 20, 16 (1441) is too cryptic to be regarded as an
authority.
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inherent value, and no one suggests that actual cross-examination is required,
or that cross-examination by any one other than the adversary or his predecessor in interest will suffice. Thus the jury's protection against the misleading qualities of hearsay is in the hands of the adversaries.
My contention, therefore, is that the hearsay rule owes its origin to
the rise or revival of the adversary system of litigation, and that its ascription
to the frailties of jurors is an ex post facto rationalization by the English
judges of the early 1800's, who substituted that notion for their earlier notion
that it was but a branch of the best evidence rule. 1 4 There is no doubt that
those judges did put great emphasis upon the inability of jurors to weigh
testimony, culminating in the astounding statement of Mr. Justice Coleridge
in Wright v. Tatham, which denounced as a fallacy the proposition that
"whatever is morally convincing, and whatever reasonable beings would form
their judgments and act upon, may be submitted to a jury."' 5 This judicial
distrust has no doubt hampered the development of exceptions to the rule,
and it may be fair to say that this offspring of the adversary system was by
judicial fiat in the first third of the 19th century, formally made the child of
the jury.
Background of Hearsay.-ProfessorBaker seems to me to be on solid
ground when he says that hearsay is not excluded because logically irrelevant;
but I fail to see what is to be gained by distinguishing the logically relevant
from the legally relevant. This can be no more than saying that courts consider irrelevant what is in fact relevant; and there is certainly no way of
determining what relevant matter is to be treated as irrelevant until after
the court has spoken. It seems to me futile to use the term, legally irrelevant,
as a mere synonym for inadmissible. Hearsay is, as Professor Baker says,
rejected for reasons of policy. Under our system the adversary has the right
that the jury be not subjected to the danger of being misled by second-hand
evidence; but in certain situations the danger is thought to be sufficiently
minimized, or countervailing reasons of policy are deemed controlling. But
as Professor Baker recognizes, it would be idle to contend that the precedents
reveal a logically consistent and reasonable framework into which these
situations may be fitted. It may be possible to find some circumstance respecting each excepted situation which distinguishes the utterance from ordinary
hearsay. But it would require naivet6 to the point of credulity to be convinced
that in many of them there was anything approaching the equivalent of oath
and cross-examination.
14. I have discussed this problem in The Jury and the Exclusionary Rides of
Evidence, 4 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 247 (1937), and in Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177 (1948). Professor Baker cites the latter
and disagrees with my conclusions.
15. 5 Cl. & F. 670, 690, 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 566 (H.L. 1838).
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Professor Baker believes that this analysis requires the rejection of
Greenleaf's and Thayer's classification of the hearsay rule under media of
proof. I cannot see the force of this argument. The fact that relevant evidence
is rejected for reasons of policy when the percipient witness is not. produced
may well be thought of as a regulation of the medium through which the
evidence is offered, And the reason. may be that the objectionable medium
prevents the adversary from testing the value of the evidence or the jury from
making a proper evaluation of it. After all, the purpose of classification is
merely to arrange for effective discussion and understanding.' 6
These expressions of disagreement with Professor Baker must not be
taken as indicating disapproval of his work. He has rendered a service to the
profession by his careful examination of the precedents, and has shown the
need for reform. It is to be hoped that his book will have the wide reading that
it deserves, and will serve to awaken the English Bar from its somnolent
satisfaction with the present rules.
EDMUND M. MORGAN*

SELF-INcRITINATION: WHAT CAN AN ACCUSED PERSON BE COMPELLED TO

Do? By Fred E. Inbau. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1950.
Pp. x, 91. $2.50.
This book is Publication Number 93 of the "American Lecture Series"
and is characterized as "A Monograph in American Lectures in Public
Protection." It is a short study by a competent authority and supplements a
similar undertaking of the same author some fifteen years ago. Its content
is more aptly described by its sub-title, "What Can an Accused Person Be
Compelled to Do ?", than by its main title, for it deals but scantily with the
history or basis of the testimonial rule against inquisition. All its chapters
but one are devoted to circumstances where the existence of the rule has
influenced courts to question the competency of evidence not wrung verbally
from the lips of the accused but somehow connected with his person,-foot,
finger, blood, whiskers, stomach contents, nail scrapings or clothing,--and
called for to be used in demonstration.
Such chapter subjects as truth serum and lie detectors, blood grouping
and intoxication tests, calligraphy and the removal of disguise, are in themselves enough to indicate how the ramifications of the rule struggle to be
16. Professor Baker: "With your remarks that there is no point in using the term
'legally irrelevant' I am in complete agreement. And I have, for a long time, been
I should happily have
unhappy over my discussion of the media of proof question ...
had that deleted from the book after it appeared."
*Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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extended and often become the ascribed support for results that could better
be charged to the account of other procedural regulations. The resounding
asseveration of John Lilburn that it is "contrary to the laws of God, nature
and the kingdom, for any man to be his own accuser," seems still to serve as
a pillar of cloud or fire even for courts equipped with a Wigmore compass.
Thus the suppression of evidence discovered by unlawful search, the rejection
of confessions obtained by torture, or even mere decencies of courtroom
decorum are hastily assumed to be the consequence of the rule against a demand for self-incrimination. Like Browning's doctor whose admiration was
kindled by the way scalp disease and leprosy mingled their symptoms, a legal
philosopher must note the phenomenon that principles of law are often confused because they happen to lead to the same result.
One who regards the recent cases cited by Professor Inbau will be impressed by the continuing vitality of the rule against compulsory self-incrimination notwithstanding the assaults that have been made upon it by logicians,
although the psychological root of its strength is still conjectural. Whether
it be what Jeremy Bentham called the Old Woman's Reason, "'Tis hard," or
the Fox Hunter's Reason, "A fair chance for his life," or any of the other
grounds ridiculed by that scholar's sarcasm, it must be conceded that the tree
stands pretty firmly fixed and that rather than be troubled for its withering,
we need be more concerned with keeping it properly pruned.
ALBERT WILLIAMS*

By Kenneth C. Davis.' St. Paul: West Pub. Co.,
1951. Pp. xvi, 1024. $8.00.

ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW.

2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A TEXT. By Reginald Parker. Indianapolis: The

Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1952. Pp. x, 344. $5.50.
By Frank E. Cooper. 3 Ann
Arbor; University of Michigan Law School, 1951. Pp. xxv, 470. $5.00.

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS.

Professor Davis has written an excellent book. The subject matter is
so difficult, and, in its present status, so unsettled, that it tends to baffle one.
But Professor Davis has it in control throughout the book.
Many of the chapters of the book were the subjects of separate articles
written by the author for law reviews in recent years. The author has thus
*Member, Nashville Bar.
1. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
2. Assistant Editor-in-Chief, NACCA Lav Journal; formerly Professor of Law,

University of Arkansas.
3. Member, Detroit Bar; Lecturer in Law, Wayne University Law School.
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been able to give second thought to the questions, and to take advantage
of criticisms made by other scholars. Thus a book is written deliberately,
and in the scholarly fashion of a series of legal essays, and not against a
publisher's deadline.
The tone and attitude of the book are favorable to administrative law.
Probably any reasonable current writer would at least have to accept administrative law on a big scale as existing, and inevitable. Since most of our
historical developments in the field of government have been improvements,
it would seem that this development, which has pressed on so persistently,
must likewise be an improvement. The author's attitude, then, of accepting
it, appraising it fairly, and suggesting betterments in its operations, is the
right attitude.
Chapter I deals briefly with the history of the administrative process
and the reasons why it has to such a degree supplanted court proceedings.
It leaves the reader wondering whether the courts could have, by better
attuning themselves to the needs of the times, retained the confidence of
the legislators and thus prevented them from turning over to other bodies
the making of many important decisions. One subject the author does not
discuss, nor does anyone else, to my knowledge. Why did the courts, having
the dogma of separation of powers at hand, permit the. entry into the
judging field by those who did not qualify under the judicial Article of the
Constitution, to engage in judging? The courts have shown some zeal to
protect the legislative power from executive encroachment, even when the
legislative tried its best to delegate its powers. They have, upon occasion,
protected the executive from legislative encroachment. But so far as keeping
trespassers out of the judging field, no real effort has been made. In modern
times there has been reason to believe that the judges have not wanted to
do some of the judging which new laws made necessary; that some felt
that they were not qualified to do it because it required knowledge and skills
which the traditional lawyer did not have; that others felt the subject matter
was undignified and smacked more of the laboratory or the picket line than
of the traditional court. If judging was to be kept in the hands of judges,
perhaps it would have been necessary to create special courts of judges
having the necessary particular qualifications for the new kinds of judging.
This would have multiplied and diluted the judiciary. At any rate it hasn't
been done, and much of the judging has passed into the hands of those who
are not, in name, judges. The system in use on the continent of Europe,
of courts of many members, but divided into senates or panels which deai
only with special problems, has certainly diminished the prestige of judges,
and has probably not produced a better quality of decisions than those of
our administrators in their special fields.

I VOL,. 5
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Chapter 4, relating to the informal activities of administrative agencies,
shows the reader what a large and important part of the work of these
agencies is really beyond the reach of judicial review or of procedural safeguards imposed by Administrative Procedure Acts. The author says "Now
that fiery resistance to the processes of the NLRB and the SEC has largely
burned itself out, one of the hottest spots in the federal regulatory administration is the FCC's control of the content of radio programs." (P. 138.)
He then proceeds to examine at length the Radio Commission's informal
practices and accomplishments. The quoted statement, showing how completely public opinion can change within a decade, is an assurance that both
agencies and their opposition can, by experience, learn how to enforce the
laws and defend their clients without stirring up useless public excitement.
Useful information for the practitioner as to what may be gained from
agencies such as the SEC and the FTC by negotiation and stipulation, is
in this chapter. Section 48 is entitled "Administrative Aggressiveness versus
Administrative Apathy in Prosecuting." The author says, "With the passage
of time administrative agencies, like men, lose their youthful vigor ....

An

outstanding example of administrative old age is founded [sic] in that
patriarch of agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission." (P. 164.)
Whether the following discussion proves the point, this reviewer does not
undertake to say, but he will say that when he was a member of a youthful
agency, he envied the ICC the kind words which dignified persons used to
use about it in public addresses. Is it worth noting that practically the
only slip of language noted in the whole book is the one contained in the
unkind sentence quoted above about the ICC?
Chapter 6, "Rule Making Procedure," and the extent to which it
should or does permit participation by interested persons, should be required
reading for administrators. They can learn what the law requires, what is fair,
what is practicable, in this important process. There have been many experiments in recent years, and the author seems to have learned about all of them.
The discussion of the sometimes attempted differentiation between rights and
privileges (p. 248) is good. There is a thorough analysis of the decisions
on the question of what sort of proceeding must precede the revocation of
a license. The author rejects the idea that there is an essential difference
between the rights of a doctor, on the one hand, and a dance-hall operator,
on the other, and concludes that the decisions, minus the dicta, do not really
make such a distinction. At page 256 there is a discussion of the question
whether, because a legislature may make laws without a hearing, an administrative body may make legislative regulations without a hearing.
Chapters 7 to 13 discuss adjudication procedure in administrative agencies. Of these, Chapter 8, "Institutional Decisions," is especially interesting.
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The first section is headed "Efforts to kill the institutional decision and its
survival." The author favors the institutional decision, and disagrees with
the statement in the First Morgan Case,4 "The one who decides must hear."
He describes what is actually done in the various types of agencies and one
gets the impression that the deciding is done in the only way in which it
is'practicable to do it, considering the volume of work and the available
hands. One might cite the medical clinic as an improvement over the individual practitioner to support the conclusion that an institutional decision is
more likely to be sound than that of one or three or five individual agency
members. Section 107, "The Institutional Decision, the APA [Administrative
Procedure Act] and the Future" shows how little the APA, developed with
conscientious deliberation over many years, resembled the hasty proposals
of the American Bar Aisociation.
Chapter 9, "Bias," is introduced by four quotations, two of which approve
and two disapprove the holding, by a judge or other deciding officers, of
strong personal -views. When a legislature creates an administrative agency,
it has in mind the accomplishment of a purpose, and wants the deciding
done by persons who favor that purpose. And if the legislature continues
to want that purpose to be accomplished, it will not long permit the agency
to survive unless it accomplishes it, or does what it can in that direction.
The author says "The theoretically ideal administrator is one whose broad
point of view is in general agreement with the policies he administers but
who maintains sufficient balance to perceive and to avoid the degree of zeal
which substantially impairs fairmindedness." (P. 374.) This reviewer believes
that practically all of the members of the federal administrative agencies fulfill
that description.
Chapter 20, "Scope of Review," deals with judicial review of administrative decision. This has been, and is, one of the most troublesome problems
of government. The difficulties are fundamental and there is no apparent
solution. When an appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court, it
is operating in its field of competence, and the decision is not often surprising
or disturbing. But when a court reviews the decision of an administrative
agency, .it may be attempting to decide questions which it is quite incapable
of deciding intelligently. The administrative decision may have been an
"institutional" one, influenced by expert accountants, engineers, doctors or
other technicians. The court has available no such assistance. So the agency,
and the friends of the policy which the agency was created to promote, are
critical, and sometimes rightly so, of the court's decision. That is one problem.
Another one is the combined results of the constitutional doctrine of separa4. 298 U.S. 468, 481, 56 Sup. Ct. 906, 80 L. Ed 1288 (1936).
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tion of powers, and of legislative lack of confidence in the competence of the
courts to decide these questions and legislative desire not to burden the
courts with the volume of work which their complete review would require.
Because of the separation of powers doctrine, the Labor Board, for
example, cannot be given the power to enforce its own orders, for example
to collect back pay from employers or fine or imprision those who disobey
cease and desist orders. So the legislatures must turn enforcement over to
the courts, and Congress lodges it in the United States Courts of Appeals.
But, for the other reason mentioned above, the courts are given only a limited
power of review, and must enforce the order if it is supported by the Board's
findings of fact, and those findings are supported by "substantial evidence
on the whole record." Thus the court may be required to use its powers
to enforce a decision not made by it, and which it would not have made if
it had had the responsibility of decision. Its situation is quite different from
that in which it has only a limited power of review over the decision of a
trial court. If it disagrees with such a decision, but cannot find that it is
"clearly erroneous" and therefore cannot reverse it, it does not have to take
any responsibility for the decision, or use its powers to enforce it. The trial
court has its own enforcement machinery. Perhaps the only comparable
situation is that of the trial court and the jury. The trial judge must frequently find it very distasteful to use the powers of his court to execute
what he regards as a completely mistaken verdict of a jury.
Perhaps a part of the distaste which the United States Courts of Appeals
feel when required to enforce orders of administrative bodies with which they
disagree is due to the fact that Congress, in limiting their powers of review,
expressed a lack of confidence in their capacity to decide such questions as
ably and conformably to the spirit of the law as the administrative body
could decide them. Their spirits may be somewhat assuaged by the more
extensive powers of review given them by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. But the basic arrangement is an
unfortunate one, and does not make for good relations between the courts
and the administrative bodies. No alternative seems to be suggested except
the creation of an administrative court of appeals, and there is much to be
said against doing that.
The closing chapter, "Scope of Review" contains an acute and thorough
discussion of how courts approach the review of administrative decisions.
Reasonable explanations are given of the inconsistent decisions. These explanations lie rather in the field of human equations, than in subtle analyses of
legal rules. Generalizations, apparently important, have been promulgated
by the Supreme Court, as in the First Morgan Case and in Crowell v.
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Benson,5 which have been repudiated or abandoned after only a few years.
The difficulty of finding right answers to the problems is thus emphasized.
But the author's treatment will be a great help to lawyers and scholars.
At the end of each chapter is a well-done condensation entitled "Summary
and Conclusions." A lawyer familiar in a general way with the subject, or
having read the book with care, could from time to time read these summaries and thus refregh himself on the important problems of Administrative
Law.
Professor Davis should be commended for a fine piece of writing and
lawyers should welcome such a good book in a field in which they need
instruction.
Mr. Parker has given us a compact, well written text. The author's
approach to the subject is shown in his preface. He says that the older
view of administrative law was that it was the law of judicial review, of
court control against administrative excesses. He, on the other hand, regards
it as including also what the Government may do to protect itself and its
constitutents against private abuses. This book then, like the Davis book,
looks with favor upon administrative processes.
The discussions of the basic doctrine of separation of powers contains
an acute historical analysis and some original views. But this author, like
the others, does not discuss the baffling question of why the courts have made
no serious effort to prevent a large part of the business of judging from being
put, by the legislature, in the hands of those who are not judges, according
to the constitutional definition.
At page 52, in his discussion of due process, the author accepts as valid
the common assertion that, in the field of revocation of licenses, the law
makes a snobbish distinction between "professional" licenses, such as those
of lawyers, doctors and dentists, on the one hand, and licenses to operate
pool rooms, dance halls and taverns for the sale of hard or soft beverages,
on the other. Davis thinks that, disregarding obiter dicta, the cases do not
support the asserted distinction.
The foundation elements, the historical separation of powers doctrine
and the constitutional requirement of due process, having been discussed, the
author, in chapter 4, introduces the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946. He uses this statute, throughout the rest of the book, as the
framework on which to hang the discussion of the problems of administrative
law. He does not think that the Act made much new law and says that
"the Act's chief merit lies in the fact that it has refrained from any telling
5. 285 U.S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932).
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One may compare the statement of Mr. Justice

Frankfurter in Stark v. Wickard,6 that "There is no such thing as a common
law of judicial review in the federal courts." There was, however, by 1946,
a great body of administrative habit and practice, and of judicial decisions,
most of which was in accord with what was written into the Act. At page
63 the author quotes Savigny and discusses, with wisdom, the possibility
of successfully codifying the law of any subject at any given time.
In the discussion of internal organization within administrative agencies
the author says, of the separation of functions within agencies: "The TaftHartley Act has established a unique exception by making, to a certain degree
at least, the Board's General Counsel a separate agency. This experiment
has not proved to be an administrative success and is not likely to be
repeated." (P. 108.) This would seem to be a too hasty conclusion. This
reviewer has the impression that, currently, the experiment is working well
enough, and that the dire predictions that it would prove to be an impossible
arrangement have not been fulfilled.
On pages 111, 113 and 263 the author adverts, critically, to the doctrine
of the National Labor Relations Board that it is privileged to refuse to take
jurisdiction of cases which fall within its statutory powers if it thinks that
its taking these cases would not effectuate the policy of the statute. The
doctrine does have about it an air of royal grace which reminds one of the
petitions addressed to the crown before the chancellor's function as a court
of equity became regularized.
In the discussion of regulations and interpretations the author gives us
the interesting information at page 196 that in Europe, in the absolute monarchies, it was permissible for a court to ask the monarch what he meant
by his ambiguously worded statute, and that the French Civil Code expressly
outlawed this practice. In the Office of Price Administration, during the last
war, persons affected by price orders were invited and encouraged to inquire,
when they were in doubt. The consequence was that, for one person, the
lawful price was what regulation seemed to say it was while to another person
who had inquired what the regulation meant, the lawful price was what the
officials had intended to say that it should be. It would be quite impracticable,
of course, to make such an inquiry of a legislature.
The subject of administrative decisions, what they must be based upon
and how they may be made is disucssed with understanding. The recent
important Supreme Court decisions in the Universal Camera7 and Pittsburgh
6. 321 U.S. 228, 311, 64 Sup. Ct. 559, 88 L. Ed. 426 (1944).
7. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 Sup. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456
(1951).
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cases are explained (p. 226), and their effects, so far, on lower
court decisions are noted. The failure of the famous First Morgan Case
decision to change the practice of "institutional decisions" is observed on
page 231. There seems not to be in the book an adequate description of the
institutional decision nor an appraisal of its merits and demerits.
The author disposes of the subject of enforcement of administrative
decisions through the courts in two pages. (Pp. 283-84.) There is no
mention of the tendency of this process to create friction between the agencies
and the courts. The more pleasant part of the process, the weighing of the
evidence and the reasoning out of a wise solution of the problem has, largely,
been taken away from the courts by the statutes, and lodged with the agency.
The less pleasant part, enforcement, has, for reasons largely of constitutionality or economy, been left with the courts. And they don't enjoy the
chore, and sometimes do it grudgingly.
The last chapter is a short discussion of claims against the government
for misadministration, which shows that, in general, such claims cannot be
enforced. The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 did not include them. 9
There is a large body of law concerning the interpretation of provisions
commonly written into Government contracts, which provisions the Government uses defensively when it is sued for breach of contract. Decisions by
contracting officers, by heads of departments or appeals boards acting for
heads of departments, by the United States Court of Claims or, if the claim
involves less than $10,000, by United States District Courts, and decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States, are numerous. The law and
the practice of how the Government treats those who contract with it, are
important. One wonders why it receives no treatment in textes on administrative law.
Professor Parker's book is a useful text on a difficult subject.
Mr. Cooper's book is one of the University of Michigan Legal Studies,
and is worthy of that distinguished company of books. The title might indicate
a somewhat narrow scope for the book, but one finds that court litigafion has
involved so many of the activities of administrative agencies, that the. whole
subject of administrative law is quite well covered by the book. The author
is not as sympathetic to the administrative agencies as is Professor Davis, but
is, on the whole, fair and realistic in his comments. He briefly gives the
history of the development of administrative agencies, and the reasons why
they were needed to cope with the problems of the times. He is unable, as
8. NLRB v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 69 Sup. Ct. 1283, 93 L. Ed. 1602

(1949).

9. Mr. Parker has subsequently written more at length oi this subject. See Parker,
The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadminstratio, 5 VAND. L. Rav. 167 (1952).
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everyone is, to fit them logically into a constitutional system whose ideal is
the separation of governmental powers into three divisions. He thinks
that when administrative agencies, by delegation, legislate, they exercise legislative functions, and when they by legislative authority, judge, they exercise
judicial functions, and that the quasi prefix is only a fiction. He seems to
think that the courts have not been effective in keeping administrative agencies
within bounds, and that the legislatures must be looked to for such relief.
(P. 47.) However, the book contains little discussion of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, the most notable attempt to do what the author
recommends.
Chapter 9, "Presentation of Evidence," contains the statement at page
180:
"While often freed by statutory provision from the necessity of following the
common-law rules of evidence--or, as it is not infrequently expressed, the technical
rules of evidence-most agencies in practice, and often by specific agency rule, apply

the fundamental principles of relevancy, materiality, and probative force in a manner
not unlike that of equity courts. Partly, this results from their constant consciousness
of the necessity of supporting all findings by 'substantial evidence,' in order to avoid
the possibilities of judicial reversal of their determinations . ..."

This patronizing suggestion that administrative officers do not act like idiots
and waste their time listening to evidence that does not bear upon or tend
to prove anything relating to the question in hand, but that they refrain
from acting like idiots partly, forsooth, because with that acumen with which
nature on occasion endows idiots, they know that if they don't act wiser
than they are they will get caught at it, is really not worthy of the author
or the book. There may have been administrative officers who thought that
some evidence tended to prove something when some judges thought it did
not, and either the officer or the judges may have been right, but the judges
had the last word. The way in which the statutes are written tends to indicate that the legislatures think the administrators are more competent to
judge how much certain evidence proves in the field assigned to the various
agencies, than the judges do. And the judges recognize that, when it
concerns the balance sheet for the rate schedule of a railroad. But as to
labor relations, for example, not only every judge, but every man in the
street and in the barber shop and tavern knows all the answers; and either
there are no experts, or everyone is an expert-everyone except those rare
judges and laymen who are so wise that they recognize their own possible
limitations.
On page 190, the author, discussing the drawing of inferences, says:
"Where the important question is not a matter of primary fact but of inference,

it is inevitable that an agency approaching a case (as many administrative agencies
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do) with a desire to reach one result, if possible, rather than another, will often find

it easy to make an inference on facts which to a totally disinterested judge" would not
preponderate in support of the inference."

This reviewer can only say that, so far as the important federal administrative agencies are concerned, he has never known even one such agency
as the author describes.
In the last chapter, "The Scope of Judicial Review," there is an interesting suggestion of possible reasons why the courts review some kinds of
cases, and decisions of some agencies, more freely than others. There may
be merit in the analysis, though there is something offensive in the idea that
administrative agencies should be less carefully watched by the courts when
they make decisions with regard to the conduct of public business than when
they make decisions affecting private business. It may be rather that the
differences lie in the age and respectability of the agency, the feeling of the
judges that the subject matter is so unknown to them that they could probably
not improve upon the administrative decision, and their sense of the 'mood"
of the legislature in enacting the legislation.
This is a thoughtful and carefully written small book which is a valuable
addition to the growing literature about Administrative Law.
J. WARREN MADDRN*
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Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1951. Pp. xviii, 339. $7.00.
It is impossible for today's practicing lawyer to keep up with all the
advance sheets of his state appellate courts and the federal reports, let alone
the leading textbooks and law review articles. Consequently, we must have
various capsulized versions of current legal works, even as we have vitamized
and briefed forms of food products.
So, I presume the book reviewer preforms his "capsulized activity," if he
himself, having had some experience in the particular field of which he reviews, does a vicarious reading, thereby recommending or disproving of the
tome. (I remember the late beloved Max Radin's book reviews with something
of awe. He was an exponent of the "capsulized version": he is the only man I
ever knew who could review a book to thoroughness and still leave uncut
many of the pages in it!)
*Judge, United States Court of Claims; Chairman, National Labor Relations board,

1935-40.
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At the outset of our review, we unhesitatingly state that we approve
the work Products Liability and the Food Consumer, by Reed Dickerson.
We recommend it to anyone trying a case involving products liability.
Probably 70% of all tried civil cases are personal injury actions. A fair
estimate would be to say that 10% of these are products liability cases. They,
however, are not the "blue chips" of litigation. The reader will recognize in the
cited cases injuries much more vexatious than disabling, this both. to the
plaintiff and the defendant. He must likewise be impressed with the fear, or
hope, as the case may be, of the potentiality of his too becoming a plaintiff.
For, unless he has no concern with the law of average, one cannot read
about the amazing variety of defects in the startling array of invented commodities without to himself thinking, "But for a safer bottling method, there
go I!"
Dickerson's art of writing has nicely blended in the economic with the
legal. Under his topics of "Compensation" and "Prevention" he cites interesting statistics on claims presented for the particular type of action. Thus, for
the X Dairy, 53% of foreign substance claims (70 out of 133) brought an
average of $23.68. In another instance of the R. M. Grocery Co., 63%o were
decided in the plaintiff's favor, while the recoveries in which damages were
awarded averaged $1,282.29, with a median recovery of $600.
This reviewer, having authored "The Adequate Award"' and "The
More Adequate Award,' 2 hardly finds favor with some of these awards allowed. Of course there are more adequate and therefore more tragic examples.
Says the author:
"Each class of food product has its peculiar risks. Both claims and complaints tend
to bunch around these risks and call attention to the sore spots. For large milk companies, the experience of the X Dairy in recent years is probably typical. In its
metropolitan business, the X Dairy received 1,724 complaints of various kinds, of which
about 700 represented claims for money. Two hundred of the 1,724 were individually
examined. Of these, 69 were for glass, 17 for dirt, 10 for solder pellets (in canned
milk), 12 for unclassified foreign substances, 5 for cockroaches, 4 for wire or tin,
3 for wood, 2 for soap, 2 for kerosene, and 1 each for tacks, lead soldiers, rubber darts,
matchsticks, wax, cereal flakes, rust, snails, straw, bottle caps, pieces of meat, potash,
hairpins, and tinfoil. There were also 14 cases whose precise cause, other than a
peculiar odor or taste, were unidentified, 35 hand laceration claims caused by defective
bottles or bottles to which broken glass adhered, 2 sour milk complaints, 2 defective
caps, 2 defective hood wires, and one bottle explosion." (P. 248.)

The author shows that of the approximately 700 claims mentioned above,
395 were-settled for an average of $24.58! Total: $9,710.85. He states that
1. 39 CALIF. L. Rxv. 1 (1951), also in 1951 INs. L.J. 577.
2. BELLI, THE MoRE ADEQUATE AWARD (1952) (obtainable from the reviewer's
office, 240 Stockton St., San Francisco).
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"the pressure of claims is evident also in the experience of M. Packing
Company during a recent one-year period. The total outlay for the period was
$33,841, a figure well worth paring, even though the company had only one
claim for each $2,000,000 of sales, or $.0005 for each dollar of sales !" (P. 249.)
Dickerson also examines the plaintiff and statement is made that claimants
tend to come disproportionately from the "poorer classes" that otherwise are
outside the circle of "nice" people who are reluctant to press legal claims. It
is also stated that the rising claims consciousness developed since World War
I.
It is interesting to note that the author states that not for the consumer,
but because of the consumer's complaint, numerous preventive measures have
been taken. The function of plaintiff and his personal injury lawyer may indirectly be seen herein:
"A large national packing house, for example, reports that trichinosis claims led
them to put in a 20-day freezing process for pork to be eaten without cooking. Cock-

roaches have tightened certain housekeeping measures. Metal in sausages has brought
greater care in the inspection and use of shovels for handling sausage filler. Glass in
sausages has resulted in rules forbidding workers to include milk bottles with their
lunch boxes, or to wear wrist watches with glass faces. Thermometers have to be of
shatterproof glass" I (P. 253.)
These reported instances by the author bring to this reviewer's mind the
case of Pillars v. R. J.Reynolds Tobacco Co.,3 which he had occasion to cite
'some years ago. Plaintiff had bitten into a plug of chewing tobacco. He found
a human toe therein. Said the court in the understatement of that year, "some'4
one has been very careless !
Here is a field, however, in which contributory negligence has seldom
defeated recovery. Says the author: "As eater, the consumer has no legal
incentive to examine what he is eating, and a failure to take this precaution
is uniformly held not to bar recovery. At the table, or otherwise in the act of
eating, most guards are down. .

.

.To require him to verify all suspicions

might produce, in the words of an Illinois appellate court, 'hunger in the
midst of plenty.'" (Pp. 77-78.)
We have tried our share of the products liability cases: toothbrushes in
beer bottles, a mouse in a Cola bottle that beverage being drunk by a pregnant
woman and claimed miscarriage, beauty aid burn cases, beauty shop hair curling cases. (We even tried one involving a preparation to straighten colored
people's hair; it did, but only after the hair spontaneously detached itself from
3. 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918).
4. The full quotation is: "We can imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human

toes could not be left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found in chewing tobacco,
it seems to us that somebody has been very careless." 78 So. at 366.
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the skull.) We have had exploding bottles,5 decomposed meat in sandwiches,
and ptomaine poisoning from a hamburger steak in a Chinese restaurant,
which last case almost posed the problem of caveat emptor.
But the potential dietary jackpot is not truly contemplated, however,
until one reads, on page 235 of the success of the hungry consumer in cases
of trichinosis, botulism, lead poisoning, undulant fever, indigestion, stomach
inflammation and ulcers, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, cramps, hernia, hemorrhoids, fainting spells, lacerations of the tongue, gums, mouth, and intestinal
tract, broken teeth or dental plate, loss of teeth, mouth burns, depleted
vitality, loss of weight, impairment of general health, miscarriage, fever, pain,
suffering, nervous shock, mental anguish and "humiliation," aggravation of
existing' disease, hospital expenses, X-rays and medical treatment, loss of
work. This is only a partial list.
The more "adequate" cases are contained in the footnote on page 237,
such as a mouse in kidney saute, mucuous substance in Coca Cola, mouse in
Coca Cola, mouse in chicken pie, cockroaches in pie, fly in bacon, bug in
bread, centipede in soup, mouse in preserves and so forth. (This is definitely
a book not to be read at the supper table.)
Under the discussion of the problem of fraud, we believe the author
is unrealistic in citing from the National Canners Association: "Thirty years
experience ... demonstrated that a large proportion of the claims are either
grossly exaggerated or fraudulent ....
Claims of this character have increased
to such an extent in some cities that the local courts have found it necessary,
with the co-operation of the local bar associations, to call for an investigation
into the activities of certain attorneys." (P. 263.)
We regret that in an otherwise very realistic, practical and well-authenticated book, these remarks should be made. We do not believe them to be
factual. It is difficult to believe that one would lay claim to having partaken,
for example, of a mouse kidney pie without actually and unfortunately having
so participated. It is interesting also to note that the index system of the claims
bureau of the Association of Casualty & Surety Companies keeps a service for
subscribers, including, as of October 1, 1950, about 202 insurance companies
and 132 self-insurers, who report the names, addresses, doctors and lawyers
of accident claimants. "From the information pooled, the Claims Bureau is
frequently able to intercept the fraudulent claim repeater." (P. 263.)
Justice Traynor, of the California Supreme Court, writing a concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,6 recognized the availability of
5. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
6. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
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insurance by the manufacturer and an imposition of absolute liability. Dickerson comments: "At the same time, there is the larger interest of the innocent
consumer to be considered; and since it is his needs that give meaning in the
first instance to the operation of the food business, he should not be compelled
to accept without redress the individually devastating effects of risks that
can be better borne or distributed by those who profit from the enterprises to
which they attach." (P. 265.)
The chapter headings and sub-headings are excellent. It is the application
of the "common sense" method of indexing that should be more prevalent
in law books. For instance, under title "Fault of the Buyer," the subheads are
"The Problem," "Negligence Cases," "'Warranty Cases." Under "Some
Considerations of Public Policy," are the subheads "Arguments for and
against holding the retailer absolutely liable." Under the main head "Liability
of the Manufacturer for Breach of Warranty," the various subheads of
privity appear, and under the topic of "Liability of the Manufacturer for
Negligence," the various problems of proof are broken down. Under "The
Trichinosis Cases," there are at least 18 different headings, such as "'Trichinous pork is unwholesome, but judgment for the defendant'-Contributory
fault," "Pork to be eaten without cooking."
The writing is logical, salient, and terse. The book
footnoted, the table of cases is excellent, the appended "select
relating to liability for defective products other than food is
are ample citations from the Year Books to Yeo v. Pig 'N
Shops.

is extremely well
list of authorities"
interesting. There
Whistle Sandwich

In all, the book is recommended for any lawyer with a products liability
case. First, for a general background, into all phases of the problem, historical,
legal and economical. Interesting phrases for jury argument and possible
"demonstrative evidence" are presented. The book is as readable as a novel.
Secondly, the book is likewise available for specific authority in a particular
case.
MELVIN M. BELLI*

By William J. Bowe. Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1952. Pp. 100. $2.10.

TAX PLANNING FOR ESTATES.

The first edition of this book appeared in 1949. The author points out
that "since that time, the Revenue Act of 1950 and the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 have introduced material changes of vital importance to
*Member, Belli, Ashe & Pinney, San Francisco,

California.
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estate planners. The new contemplation of death provision, the redemption
of stock to pay death taxes amendment, the drastic modifications with respect to charitable trusts and other tax exempt entities, the complete overhauling of the powers of appointment sections of the gift and estate tax law,
necessitated substantial changes in the text if it were to continue to be usable."
(P. iii.) The present revision brings the text up to date. It provides much
valuable material for the troubled layman and those seeking to be of help,
the lawyer and the experienced estate planning counsel.
That nothing is more certain than death and taxes all agree, and as to
the latter the author stresses the need for contemplation of the steady increase
and converse decrease in amount of exemptions. The many suggested solutions, programs and plans of the writer, are all well reasoned and present a
sound basis for the avoidance of taxes without attendant danger.
We are told that much can be accomplished under the present law.
However, Mr. Bowe reminds us of existing pitfalls and the need for proper
planning with emphasis on the plan being flexible. Here lies the secret of
the author's continued success in this all important field. Quite often laymen and many so-called experts typify the old expression, "fools rush in
where angels fear to tread," in dealing with tax problems. If the warnings
of Mr. Bowe are taken to heart, much can be achieved by those desirous of
tax advantages or savings. Should changes occur in the laws and regulations,
as they undoubtedly will from time to time, all will not be lost as otherwise
would be the case with an inflexible plan.
The clarity of this text and earlier work of Mr. Bowe on the same subject allows an easy recognition of the many problems mentioned in the discussion. However, the examples given and the solutions suggested warn
against planning within the field without competent counsel. The considered
necessity of an early revision of the original text should compel our attention to the requirement of continually reviewing pertinent law and changes
therein.
Summarizing the conclusions to be reached from the concise presenta.
tion, young and old, those of moderate means and others with more at stake,
should plan now for the future in view of the assured increase in the obligations of the governments, Federal and State. The savings alone that can be
accomplished regarding income taxes, gift taxes and so-called death taxes,
clearly illustrated in this revision, warrant the interested person in first
reading this edition and then applying the appropriate suggestions to his
particular case.
GEORGE HENRY TYNE*
*Member, Tyne, West and Sugg, Nashville, Tennessee.
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THE ESTATE TAX HANDBOOK.

Bender & Co., 1951.

Edited by J. K. Lasser.'

Pp. 846.

Albany: Matthew

$15.00.

As the title suggests, the articles collected in this book are not confined
to estate tax planning problems. The final article is entitled, for example,
"How to Prepare an Estate Tax Return." However, the estate planning
approach is evident on almost every page. Titles like "How to Coordinate
Business Transactions with Estate Planning," "How Trusts Should Be

Planned to Help Estate Planning, ....
How to Avoid Transfers Intended to
Take Effect at Death," "How to Use Powers of Appointment in Estate Tax
Planning," "How to Integrate Life Insurance into Estate Tax Planning,"
ire indicative of the major emphasis to be found throughout the book. There
are 23 articles in all. Five are devoted to marital deduction problems; two
deal specifically with life insurance and many others touch this problem
indirectly; stock purchase agreements and their effect on value for estate
tax purposes are discussed in considerable detail in at least five articles in
the book. 2 Indeed, one of the merits in a collection such as this is that
because the basic problems in estate planning overlap the necessarily artificial
separation of subjects, s the reader gets the different slants of many experts
dealing with the same problem from varying approaches.
As perhaps one should expect, the quality and value of the articles differ
tremendously-some are excellent, definitely superior. Mintz and Eifler,
"How Trusts Should Be Planned to Help Estate Planning" and two articles
by Foosaner on how to avoid transfers taking effect at or after death 4 are
recommend for study to all lawyers working in this field and should be
required reading for all law students. Other articles impress one as copies
of talks hastily revised and sadly lacking the precise and painstaking writing
that is so important in this field of the law if the novice is not to be misled.
Some articles are excellently footnoted with all of the leading cases referred
to and discussed. Others contain little or no reference material.
One fault-perhaps unavoidable in a collection of this number-is that
the articles were obviously written at different dates and in a few instances
1. Adjunct Professor of Taxation, New York University; C.P.A. Other contributors
include Martin Atlas, Frank B. Appleman, William J.Casey, Elmo H. Conley, Arnold
L. Cutler, Robert H. Eifler, Malvern B. Fink, Samuel J. Foosaner, Wilbur H. Friedman,
Alan L. Gornick, Sydney A. Gutkin, Benjamin Harrow, Raymond W. Hilgedag, George
J. Laikin, George B. Lourie, Seymour S. Mintz, Charles A. Morehead, Roger K. Powell,
I. A. Powers, Harry J.Rudick and R. L. Rockefeller.
2. Discussion commences at pp. 6, 41-46, 253, 359, 413.
3. Thus one cannot discuss buy and sell agreements without getting into problems
of valuation, stock options, life insurance, etc. Similarly one cannot write about trusts
in estate planning without considering transfers intended to take effect at death, powers
of appointment, etc.
4. The first involves trust transfers and the second "other transfers."
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there is a regrettable failure to adequately revise the text in the light of
later developments. For example, "How Trusts Should Be Planned to Help
Estate Planning" must have been completed before the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 became law.5 There is not even a footnote to suggest the
very drastic changes which that act brought about. In the article entitled,
"How to Use Powers of Appointment in Estate Planning" ten pages are
devoted to Section 811 (f) as it read from 1942 to June 28, 1951, again with
nothing to indicate that it is no longer law; then follow only 24 pages of
not very informative material on the New Act. 6 The discussion on life
insurance and stock redemption agreements at page 357 was written after
the Tax Court decision in the Emoloid case, whereas in another article
obviously written after reversal of that case by the court of appeals, the same
topic is discussed at page 419 but in the very changed atmosphere which the
later opinion has created.
The book is excellent. The above criticisms are merely to say that it
could be better. It contains a very complete reference and discussion, with
many helpful suggestions, of all the tax saving tools available to the estate
planner. It is definitely recommended reading for all who draw wills, both
the beginner and the seasoned practitioner.
WLLIAM

J. BowE*

5. See pp. 145, 152.
6. Pp. 262-72, 272-74. See by way of comparison the excellent discussion in Turk,
The Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 90 TRuSTS & ESTATES 428 (1951).
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

